Abstract. This paper is concerned with supply chain competition and "Free-riding effect" under the assumptions that consumer demands in both online and offline markets are relative to each other. It focuses on "leader-follower" game model under supply chain framework of "one traditional manufacturer leader and one weakest traditional retailer , one online manufacturer is an up-rising star, and the traditional manufacturer leader competes with the online manufacturer in online markets". After that the paper analyses supply chain partners' optimal decisions and "Free-riding effect" by numerical analysis, especially about the coping strategies of the strong manufacturer. Some conclusions could be found out as follows: Firstly,when the strong traditional manufacturer improves its online promotion effort level, if its promotion level is low, the weakest retailer could achieve "free ride effect" , if it is high, the online manufacturer could achieve "free ride effect" obviously. Secondly, when online market demands become bigger, the retailer's "free ride effect" disappears after come first, however the online manufacturer retailer's "free ride effect" is obvious. As online manufacturer's competitiveness becomes bigger, the strong traditional manufacturer's predominance couldn't be maintained by increasing offline market's capacity.
Introduction
Today E-Commerce and Internet Technology tide have permeate all aspects of lifes, and they infused into kinds of industry supply chain channels, such as online and offline channels have no longer been a stranger for everyone. About the conflict and coordination of online market research, there are a large number of domestic and foreign literature foundation. Such as, Balasubramanian (1998) , Lee H(2002) , Chhajed, Hess(2003) , etc. Some traditional manufacturers whose channel status were strongest have enter into online markets when e-commerce came out firstly, such as Lenovo, Nike, Uniqlo, etc. All of this kind of manufacturers have met some new online manufacturers especially in clothing industry, on the other hand, Still some of them keep their traditional retailor channels. Then various "Free-riding effect" come out that give the traditional manufacturers much pressures to compete and change. In Zhou Jiangheng,etc.(2016) had explained two types of Free-riding effects, which are "Final end free-riding effect" and "Wholesale price free-riding effect". However, in this paper it will discuss the retailor's free-riding effect and the up-rising star's free-riding effect.
Model Description and Analysis
It supposes that the manufacturer   
,, 
The parameter   M play a leader-follower game to decide optimal variables. Secondly, being a weakest supply chain partner, the traditional retailer participates in dual market competition.
By backward induction, All of the optimal variables and revenues can be calculated in Table 1 . Accordingly, it can find out some theorems and corollaries as follows: 
Optimal Strategies for the Traditional Retailer
And some theorems could be found to tell us basic principles, which are showed as follows: Theorems 1 Under dual market competition, the condition that the traditional retailer r could exist is
Corollary 1 When Manufacturer 2
M is in second-rate predominance status, the higher the offline retailer's channel promotion level, the bigger its optimal revenues. Corollary 2 When Manufacturer 2 M is in second-rate predominance status, the greater the sales promotion effort level's difference between online and offline markets, the lower the offline retailer's optimal revenues. . By derivation it concludes that (all letters involved here will be showed later),
Optimal Strategies for Online Manufacturer
And some theorems could be found to tell us basic principles, which are showed as follows: Theorems 2 Under dual market competition, the condition that online manufacturer 2 could get optimally maximal revenues is * When industry e-commerce development level is certain, offline market capacity r a 's change will affect some key variables, which gives out several kinds of states as follows, such as in Table 2 , Table  3 and Figure 1 .
Free-riding Effect Based on Promotion Effort Levels
Firstly, the key variables are 1 h , 3 h . Online market capacity rate g reflects the development level of e-commerce . as the variable 1 h increasing, the traditional manufacturer 1 M 's optimal quantity descends slightly, which means that increasing the online manufacturer 2 M 's channel promotion effort level couldn't shake the manufacturer 1 M 's status. Besides, as the variable 3 h increasing, both the traditional manufacturer 2 M optimal quantity and revenue improve at the same time, however, the traditional manufacturer 1 M has to provide a reduced price to slow down the competition pressure, and the retailer reduces its price too. Table 1 Optimal variables of the model Table 2 Capacity optimization's numerical simulation analysis Table 3 M takes more industry responsity, and its production allocation tends to online market more,from 0.432 to 2.145.
Finally, with online market capacity rate g improving, both the ratailor and online manufacturer 2 M have "Free-riding effect", just as with the variable 1 h increasing their free-riding effect shows. What the difference is that, with the variable 1 h increasing, the consumer can achieve much more welfare than the latter, but the online market capacity rate g improving has more influence on industry market size, so in the latter the retailor's"Free-riding effect"is more outstanding than the before.
In the end, the coping strategies of traditional manufacturer 1 M are the key questions in next research of this paper. It should focus on contract design, the role shift of traditional retailor, etc. to try to improve supply chain efficiency.
